1. In this review "European Community" and "E.C." refer to the treaty group of nations bound by the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Rome Treaty), Mar. 25, 1957, 298 6 That left each E.C. Member State with legislative power over its national intellectual property law, subject to the authority of the E.C. Council to direct "approximation of such laws, . . . as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market." 7 "Approximation" efforts did not achieve a functioning supra-national E.C. trademark until 1996, 8 and the creation of a supra-national E.C. patent still awaits ratification by all Member States of the Community Patent Convention of 1975. 9 The institutional diversity between the U.S. and the E.C. is in their governmental structures. The U.S. Constitution followed Montesquieu's concept of a government of three separate branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. Of such branches, the Rome Treaty grants comparable judicial power to the European Court of Justice, but diffuses legislative and executive authority among the E.C.'s Commission, Parliament, and two Councils with complexities that baffle U.S. observers and would astonish Montesquieu.
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Because of the peculiarities of the Rome Treaty, the E.C. deals with the supra-national effect of Member States' intellectual property laws chiefly as a function of E.C. authority over supra-national E.C. competition law, and it does that dealing chiefly by competition regulations and rulings of the E.C. Commission, periodically adjusted to conform to decisions of the European Court of Justice. 11 Understanding E.C. competition law is consequently the best route to understanding E.C. intellectual property rights, and that is the path that Steven Anderman ( 17 Following the pattern of its predecessors, the Technology Transfer Regulation (the full text of which is an appendix to this book) grants time-limited "block exemptions" for described types of licenses, 18 identifies green-light provisions "which are generally not restrictive of competition" 19 and red-light provisions that invalidate otherwise permitted licenses, 20 and establishes a procedure for voluntary disclosure that assures exemption if the Commission does not "oppose" within four months; 21 but the Regulation reserves the Commission's right to "withdraw the benefit of this Regulation" in particular cases that breach Rome Treaty competition rules. 22 Intellectual property rights are also considered in calculating the "dominant position" of "undertakings" for purposes of the anti-monopoly rules of Rome Treaty Article 86. 23 This book is a down-to-earth practitioner's handbook, not an academic comparison of E.C. law with the law of other jurisdictions. In fact, the book's perspective is so inwardly European that it barely mentions intellectual property licensing that moves from, or into, the European Community as a whole. Professor Anderman does acknowledge, however, the influence of U.S. antitrust law on the formation of E.C.
